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Dear Friends, 
Please note that (i) this paper is a work in progress, and (ii) this paper forms a 
section of a larger work.  For both of these reasons, this paper is made available 
with the stipulation that it will not be cited without the permission of the author.  
Should you have any questions or comments about this paper do not hesitate to 
contact me at martinjones@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
Regards, 
Martin Jones
CHAPTER TWO: CANADIAN REFUGEE JURISPRUDENCE ON MILITARY 
SERVICE EVASION 
 
Compulsory military service is practiced in about 100 countries; conscription exists as a 
reality in a majority of the member states of the United Nations and for an overwhelming 
majority of the population of the world.1  Compulsory military service has been both 
denounced as nothing less than the surrender of “the most essential rights of personal 
liberty”2 and praised as the sine qua non of full citizenship.3  Despite a debate that 
continues to this date concerning its legitimacy, compulsory military service is a 
continuing phenomenon that affects the lives of many millions of men around the world.4
 
Many of the countries requiring military service are a significant source of refugees.  Of 
the top ten source countries for refugees in 2002 at least eight require military service.5  It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the topic of compulsory military service, and in particular 
the issue of the status of military service evaders, has been raised in refugee 
determination proceedings.6  It will be the purpose of this paper to asses the treatment of 
                                                 
1 See infra, at Chapter 1, page Error! Bookmark not defined. et seq., for a 
discussion of the methodological issues that require any enumeration of the total number 
of countries requiring compulsory military service to be approximate. 
2 Philip Bobbitt “National Service: Unwise or Unconstitutional” in Martin 
Anderson, ed. Registration and the Draft: Proceedings of the Hoover-Rochester 
Conference on the All-Volunteer Force (Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1982) at 
61 quoting Daniel Webster’s address to the US Congress in 1814. 
3 George Q. Flynn Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great 
Britain and the United States (Greenwood Press, Westport CN, 2002) at 15 (referring to 
the Constitution of the French First Republic which declared “[T]ous les français sont en 
requisition permanente pour la service des armies”.   
4 The male gender will be used to refer to military service evaders and objectors.  
It is accepted wisdom that language shapes as well as reflects our thinking.  While this 
observation may usually suggest the use of inclusive language, it also requires that 
inclusive language should not be used where such language would obscure the underlying 
reality.  In the case of military service, almost all of those conscripted into the military 
every year are male.  Only one country (Israel) out of the one hundred countries imposing 
conscription consistently requires females to perform military service. 
5 The top ten source countries for refugees in 2002 were Afghanistan, Burundi, 
Angola, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Vietnam, and Eritrea.  Conscription was reported to occur in all countries 
except Somalia.  See UNHCR Refugees by Numbers: 2003 (UNHCR, Geneva, 2003) at 9 
and Bart Horeman and Marc Stolwijk Refusing to Bear Arms: a world survey of 
conscription and conscientious objection to military service (War Resisters International, 
London, 1998) (hereafter “Refusing to Bear Arms”) q.v. entries for each of the top ten 
source countries. 
6 The term “conscientious objector” is avoided in this paper.  While much of the 
literature employs this term, its meaning is not consistent; the definition of “conscience” 
varies between authors.  Furthermore, it is often used to distinguish those who would 
military service evaders in the refugee jurisprudence in general, with particular attention 
to the Canadian jurisprudence. 
 
The central thesis of this paper is that the refugee jurisprudence concerning military 
service evasion has been, up to the present, plagued by fragmentation, incoherence and 
inattention.  As contrasted with refugee law in general, the jurisprudence on military 
service evasion is parochial and makes very limited use of extra-jurisdictional refugee 
jurisprudence on the topic, municipal jurisprudence on military service evasion or 
international human rights jurisprudence.7  These jurisprudential deficits have been 
accompanied by a lack of legislative and administrative attention to the subject. 
  
Notwithstanding the central thesis of this paper, it will be suggested that the deficits in 
the refugee jurisprudence are not without remedy.  A coherent approach to military 
service evasion which draws upon extra-jurisdictional refugee jurisprudence, municipal 
experience of conscription and international human rights jurisprudence can yet be 
formulated.  However, such an approach to the status of military service evaders in 
refugee law, in particular, cannot succeed without recognition of the underlying debate 
about the legitimacy of military service raised by the topic of military service evasion in 
general.   
 
This paper will be divided into three parts.  Firstly, the framework of the definition of 
refugee will be outlined in the context of the Canadian statutory and jurisprudential 
framework, including the basic elements as relevant to the determination of claims 
                                                                                                                                                 
evade military service on religious grounds from those who would evade military service 
on other grounds - suggesting a moral or spiritual priority that belies the conclusion that 
the authors would have us draw both about the worthiness of such objectors to receive 
protection and the unworthiness of other objectors to receive protection.  In order to 
avoid this confusion and the appearance of bias, the terms “military service evaders” have 
been used throughout this paper.  The use of this term also allows the debate to be 
expanded beyond an argument over the definition of “conscience”. 
7 Indeed, refugee jurisprudence has been generally characterized as being both 
open to and valuing a diverse range of influences: “In our view, the future of the 
Convention definition must be linked to the future of international law, and calls for a 
principled and intellectually creative interpretation by adjudicators.  The careful use of 
refugee law learning from other jurisdictions is already contributing to a transnational 
refugee law jurisprudence, and there is value in creating an accessible and comprehensive 
international database of refugee decisions.” (A. M. North and Nehal Bhuta “The Future 
of Protection: The Role of The Judge” 15 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 479 (2001) at 496)  This 
characterization is adopted not only by scholars and decision-makers, but also by the 
jurisprudence itself, which in places go so far as to require the consideration of foreign 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of refugee law: “The exercise I have gone through 
demonstrates that to construe the statute with a view to [a particular interpretation of 
membership in a particular social group] requires the weighing of credible evidence in 
the form of foreign jurisprudence and learned commentary.” (Canada (MEI) v. Mayers 
[1993] 1 F.C. 154 (F.C.A.) at ¶ 26) 
involving military service evasion.  Secondly, the Canadian jurisprudence thus far on the 
ability of military service evaders to gain refugee protection will be surveyed and 
organized.  Thirdly, some specific deficits of the Canadian jurisprudence to date will be 
discussed and suggestions will be made on how to bring the jurisprudence into line with 
various international human rights instruments and various municipal standards.  
However, before proceeding to an assessment of the jurisprudence, a few words should 
be said about the Canadian focus of this paper. 
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
This paper will only systematically consider the jurisprudence of Canada – although 
reference will be made to cases determined in other jurisdictions where appropriate, in 
particular the jurisprudence of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom.  The 
focus on Canadian jurisprudence is both coincidental and not without significance.  
Coincidentally, it is the Canadian jurisprudence with which the author is most familiar 
and it was the Canadian jurisprudence that first brought the complexities of military 
service evasion to the attention of the author.  Furthermore, the focus on Canadian 
jurisprudence can be seen as merely the first step in a larger project to assess the 
common-law refugee jurisprudence on military service evasion in general.  However, 
there are also additional non-coincidental reasons why the study of the Canadian 
jurisprudence is significant. 
 
Canada possesses a well-developed judicial and administrative structure to determine 
refugee status on an individualized basis.8  Its refugee determination policies have been 
the subject of much praise; in particular, the Canadian approach to gender-based claims, 
civil-war situations and child refugee claimants have been recognized for their 
progressive nature.  Canadian jurisprudence has been widely quoted in the jurisprudence 
of other countries and in scholarly literature as a guiding light in the interpretation of the 
definition of refugee.9
 
Furthermore, the Canadian jurisprudence is largely in keeping with the international 
jurisprudence on many issues raised by military service evasion.  Also, the Canadian 
jurisprudence generally refers to international jurisprudence quite frequently – thus it 
would appear to provide a useful indicator of emerging issues in the international military 
service evasion jurisprudence. 
 
For all of these reasons, the present paper explores the Canadian jurisprudence on 
military service evasion.  It is hoped that the present paper will establish a benchmark 
                                                 
8 While group determination can occur (and has occurred) in all four jurisdictions 
in special cases, the general rule in each jurisdiction is that each refugee claim is 
individually determined. 
9 While the generality of this comment may leave room for debate, this statement 
is at least valid for the interpretation of the areas at issue with the areas of refugee law at 
issue in military service evasion: the definition of persecution, nexus, laws of general 
application and state protection. 
which can be used to assess the jurisprudence of other countries.  In this respect, the 
present paper is part of a larger project to assess the common-law refugee jurisprudence 
on military service evasion, including in addition to Canada, the jurisprudence of 
Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN REFUGEE FRAMEWORK AS IT 
RELATES TO MILITARY SERVICE EVADERS 
 
The sequence of determination and appeal in Canada in relation to refugee matters is as 
follows: a determination by the IRB (the “Board”);10 an application for leave and for 
judicial review to the Federal Court of Canada (formerly, the Trial Division of the 
Federal Court); an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal (formerly the Appeal Division 
of the Federal Court); and, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.11  Not surprisingly 
the bulk of the jurisprudence on military service evasion comes from the Board and the 
Federal Court.12  While details of the Canadian refugee determination system have been 
altered recently through new immigration legislation, the core statutory definition of 
“refugee” in Canadian law remains unchanged.13
                                                 
10 The Refugee Protection Division (the “RPD”) replaced the Convention Refugee 
Determination Division (the “CRDD”) as the division of the IRB responsible for the 
determination of refugee claims; this change was a result of the immigration reforms of 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27 ) (the “IRPA”) and took effect 
on 28 June 2002.  With respect to refugees, the RPD and the CRDD apply the same 
legislative definition (taken from the 1951 Convention) in order to determine whether to 
grant protection as a refugee.  
11 See, respectively, IRPA Part II (ss. 95 to 116) and Part IV (ss. 151 to 186); 
IRPA ss. 72 to 74 and Federal Courts Act (R.S., 1985, c. F-7) (the “FCA”) ss. 17 to 18.2; 
IRPA s. 74(d); and the Supreme Court Act (R.S., c. S-19) (the “SCA”) ss. 37 to 40. 
12 There have been only two cases directly involving military service evasion 
decided by the Federal Court of Appeal (Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1993] 
F.C.J. No. 584 and Musial v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1982] 1 F.C. 290 – hereafter, 
respectively, “Zolfagharkani” and “Musial”) and no cases involving directly involving 
military service evasion decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.  In the lack of a 
leading case determined by the highest judicial body on military service evasion Canada 
is unusual.  The ultimate judicial bodies of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United 
States have all determined a military service evasion case: Sepet and another v. U.K. 
(Secretary of State), [2003] UKHL 15 (the United Kingdom) (hereafter “Sepet”); 
Applicant S v. Australia (M.I.M.A.) [2004], HCA 25 (HCA) (the High Court has also 
recently granted leave to appeal in the matter of SHBB v Australia (M.I.M.A.) 
(A257/2003, leave granted on 24 August 2004) (Australia) ; and USA (I.N.S.) v. Elias-
Zacarias (1991), 502 U.S. 478 (SC) (USA). 
13 The most significant recent change is the RPD’s additional jurisdiction to grant 
subsidiary protection in addition to refugee protection – or protection as a result of 
potential mistreatment in violation of Canada’s obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 
39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered 
 
One of the stated goals of the refugee determination process is “to fulfil Canada's 
international legal obligations with respect to refugees”14  To this end, Canada essentially 
uses the definition of refugee found in Article 1(A) of the 1951 Convention: 
 
A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion who (a) is outside each of their 
countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling 
to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or (b) not 
having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former 
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to 
return to that country.”15
 
The definition of refugee can be broken down, for the purpose of the present discussion, 
into three components: (a) the requirement of a well-founded fear of being persecuted; 
(b) the requirement that the persecution in question be for one of the five proscribed 
reasons; and, (c) the requirement that a claimant’s government be unable or unwilling to 
offer protection.  The interpretation of each of these requirements in the Canadian 
jurisprudence as they relate to military service evasion will be briefly discussed in 
sequence. 
A. REQUIREMENT OF PERSECUTION 
 
The definition of refugee does not define what it means to have a “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted”.  Drawing upon scholarly analysis, the jurisprudence has come to 
define “persecution” as a key denial of a core human right.  As stated by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, “t]he essential question is whether the persecution alleged by the 
claimant threatens his or her basic human rights in a fundamental way.”16  Reference is 
made in the Canadian jurisprudence to both internationally and municipally defined 
human rights.17  While repetition and persistence are frequently characteristics of 
persecution, a serious violation of an individual’s human rights need not be repeated in 
order to constitute persecution.18
                                                                                                                                                 
into force June 26, 1987 (the “CAT”) and International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (the “ICCPR”). 
14 IRPA, s. 3(2)(b) 
15 IRPA, s. 96.  The wording of this definition is viryally identical to that found in 
Article 1(A) of the 1951 Convention. 
16 Chan (La Forest, in dissent)  While LaForest’s remark was obiter dicta, as the 
case was decided by both himself and the majority on a different ground, his 
encapsulation of the meaning of persecution remains accurate. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Muthuthevar v. Canada (M.C.I.) [1996] F.C.J. No. 207 at ¶12: "I think it is 
settled law that, in some instances, even a single transgression of the applicant's human 
 
At issue with the issue of military service evasion is not only whether forced military 
service per se constitutes persecution but also whether the punishment that is meted out 
to an individual who evades compulsory military service is severe enough to amount to 
persecution.   
B. REQUIREMENT OF NEXUS 
 
However, not all claimants who are at risk of persecution are considered by law to be 
refugees. Only those claimants whose risk arises “for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”19  The 
requirement that persecution occur “for reasons of” one of the five enumerated grounds is 
often referred to as the requirement of “nexus”.   
The Canadian jurisprudence generally interprets nexus quite broadly.  Mixed motives or 
perceptions do not preclude a nexus, as long as some motives or perceptions are tied to an 
enumerated ground.20  Ultimately, it is the perception of the agent of persecution, which 
may or may not conform with reality, that is the most important aspect of the analysis.21  
Neutrality may be a political opinion.22 Unlike the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, 
particularly the American jurisprudence, the Canadian jurisprudence does not spend 
much time on the technicalities of nexus23
 
Although related to the requirement of a well-founded fear of persecution insofar as it 
links the fear to an enumerated reason, the requirement of nexus is an independent and 
necessary condition for a successful refugee claim.  While in some cases, a nexus may be 
a component of persecution (as in the case where a finding of an “arbitrary arrest” may 
require proof of an improper motive for the arrest), it is not a condition precedent for a 
finding of persecution.  Notwithstanding this statement, some of the jurisprudence 
continues to link persecution and nexus.24  As will be seen in the assessment of the 
jurisprudence, the undue linkage of persecution and nexus plagues, inter alia, the military 
                                                                                                                                                 
rights would amount to persecution." 
19 Article 1(A) of the 1951 Convention. 
20 Zhu v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1994] (FCA).  
21 Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1993] 3 F.C. 540. See also Rizkallah v. 
Canada (M.E.I.), [1992] 156 N.R. 1 and Canada (A.G.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 
747. 
22 Insofar as neutrality may be perceived as opposition to a political interest it can 
provide a nexus. 
23 The Canadian jurisprudence has spent a lot of time parsing the meaning of each 
particular enumerated ground, e.g. the meaning of “political opinion” or “membership in 
a particular social group”, but has spent very little time considering the significance of 
the causal element of nexus (“by reason of”) in the definition of refugee.  In this respect, 
the Canadian jurisprudence pales in comparison with the complexity of analysis (and 
debate) within the American jurisprudence (in particular, seen in the tension between the 
view of nexus expressed by the 9th Circuit and the rest of the country). 
24 Mousavi-Samani, Nasrin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4674-96). 
service evasion jurisprudence. 
 
Political opinion and religion are often cited grounds of nexus in military service evasion 
cases.  While a few military service evasion cases also make use of membership in a 
particular social group this is a decidedly underdeveloped part of the jurisprudence. 
C. REQUIREMENT OF AN INABILITY OF THE STATE TO 
OFFER PROTECTION 
 
State protection is seldom explicitly discussed in the context of military service evasion.  
However, it is an important concept to remember in assessing the claims of military 
service evaders.  The latter half of the Canadian statutory definition of refugee addresses 
the need for a failure of state protection: a refugee must be “unable or, by reason of [his] 
fear, unwilling to avail [himself] of the protection of [his country of nationality].”25
 
Generally, there is a presumption that a state can protect its citizens.  In order to rebut this 
presumption, a claimant must present “clear and convincing evidence” of a state’s 
inability to offer protection.  Such evidence can include evidence of the state’s past 
failure to offer protection to the claimant or the state’s failure to offer protection to 
similarly situated individuals.  However, notwithstanding a state’s obligation to provide 
protection, there is neither an obligation nor an expectation that the state can offer perfect 
protection. 
 
The requirement of state protection is seldom dealt with explicitly in the military service 
evasion jurisprudence.  Yet state protection is an important consideration in many 
military service evasion cases.  To take but two of the most obvious examples, claims 
based upon fear of conscription by guerillas and claims based upon the availability (or 
lack thereof) of alternate military service for conscientious objectors both require a 
careful analysis of the steps taken by the state in question to protect the claimants in 
question from persecution.  In a broader sense, the issue of state protection in a broader 
sense, lies at the heart of military service evasion and the underlying issue of compulsory 
military service: how should the state reconcile its competing obligations to itself and its 
citizenry? 
 
As will be seen in the assessment of the Canadian jurisprudence, the issue of state 
protection has been dealt with all to inadequately.  The case-law more often deals with 
state protection implicitly; there have been all too few explicit incorporations of the 
requirement of the state’s inability to offer protection into the determinations of the case-
law. 
                                                 
25 IRPA, s. 96 
III. SURVEY OF CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE26
 
There is a vast Canadian refugee jurisprudence on military service evasion.27 Although it 
is difficult to generalize, the most significant countries of origin for military service 
evaders as reported in the jurisprudence are, in no particular order, Israel, Russia, Algeria, 
Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the significant body of jurisprudence, there has been very little, if 
any, scholarly analysis of military service evasion jurisprudence.28  Hathaway’s brief, and 
now quite dated, comments on military service evasion provide the only scholarly 
guidance regularly quoted by the jurisprudence.29 Indeed, the jurisprudence as a whole 
has not been systematically analyzed by even the judiciary itself since the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Zolfagharkhani.  Unfortunately, the jurisprudence frequently 
displays this lack of attention while acknowledging it all too infrequently.30  
                                                 
26 It is acknowledged at the outset that an assessment of the jurisprudence is not in and of 
itself a neutral act.  An assessment necessarily involves the organization of the 
jurisprudence according to various underlying principles.  As in the present case, the 
underlying principles by which the organization is accomplished are seldom explicitly 
expressed in the jurisprudence.  Thus, the line between the survey of the jurisprudence 
and the subsequent analysis of the jurisprudence is tenuous.  The significance of the 
selection of these principles will be discussed at further length in the analysis of the 
jurisprudence that follows this survey. 
27 A search of the reported decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the 
“IRB”) since its inception lists almost one thousand reported refugee determination 
decisions discussing military service evasion.  A review of these cases reveals that in 
about 100 of these cases the status of an evader of military service was a determinative 
issue.  Reported IRB decisions are limited to cases that are “correct” in law and of 
“interest” to the Board or the public.  A search of Federal Court of Canada (and 
appellate) decisions reveals about 24 decisions discussing the evasion of military service.  
The IRB decisions date back to its creation in 1989; the Federal Court decisions date 
back to a similar date. 
28 The two exceptions to this statement are a case note by Edward Corrigan 
(Edward Corrigan “Refusal to Perform Military Service as a Basis for Refugee Claims in 
Canada” 8 Imm. L. R. (3d) 272-286 (2000)) and a section of a larger work comparing US 
and Canadian refugee jurisprudence by Mark R. Von Sternberg (The grounds of refugee 
protection in the context of international human rights and humanitarian law : Canadian 
and United States case law compared (M. Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2002) at 126 to 
143).  Additionally, several articles have been published recently that make passing 
reference to military service evaders in the Canadian jurisprudence, including the fairly 
cursory treatment of the subject in Olugbenga Shoyele “Armed Conflicts and Canadian 
Refugee Law and Policy” I.J.R.L. 16:4 , 547 (December 2004). 
29 Goodwin-Gill’s comment are also quoted, albeit much less frequently. 
30 It is hoped that the Court of Appeal may soon have an opportunity to remedy 
this defect.  On 12 October 2004, the Federal Court referred to the Court of Appeal a 
question related to how military service evasion can constitute the basis for a refugee 
 
In organizing the cases, it is useful to categorize based upon the underlying nature of the 
claim: whether the fear of military service itself is the basis of claim or whether an 
ancillary aspect of military service is the basis of the claim.  An intermediate category of 
claims based upon conscientious objection will also be canvassed.  Each of these 
categories will be dealt with in sequence. 
A. REFUGEE CLAIMS BASED UPON PROHIBITED FORMS OF 
MILITARY SERVICE 
 
It has been often said that compulsory military service per se cannot provide the basis for 
a successful refugee claim.  This is not entirely true.  Compulsory military service may 
per se provide a basis of claim where the military service in question is in some way a 
prohibited form of compulsory military service.   
 
Returning to the root of “persecution” in international human rights law, according to the 
ICCPR, no person “shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”.31  
However, the ICCPR grants an exemption from the prohibition for “[a]ny service of a 
military character”.32 Therefore, by definition, any military service that does not fall 
within the exception is a violation of a claimant’s right to be free of forced labour – and 
can consequently be viewed as potentially persecutory.   
 
While the brief wording of the exception for “any service of a military character” can be 
seen as fairly broad, in fact the refugee jurisprudence has interpreted it fairly restrictively.  
Consequently, there are several categories of prima facie “service of a military character” 
that will be found to be improper.  Forced performance of such military service 
automatically constitutes persecution.33  In other words, performance of such military 
service would be persecutory even if the claimant performed such service or had no 
particular objection to such service.34  The persecutory nature of such conscription lies in 
                                                                                                                                                 
claim.  The Court of Appeal will likely hear the case sometime in 2005.  Order of 12 
October 2004 in the matter of Ates v. Canada (M.C.I.) (FC) 
31 ICCPR, Article 8(3)(a). 
32 Ibid. Article 8(3)(c)(ii). 
33 Of course, this statement assumes forced performance of a more than a minimal 
amount of military service.  This presumption is consistent with the vast majority of 
military service regimes in place in the world.  However, in the alternative that 
performance of such improper military service is not forced, any punishment or 
mistreatment for failure to perform such service must still be serious and persistent 
enough to rise to the level of persecution.  In other words, while forced performance of 
such service is persecution an alternative insignificant punishment for failure to perform 
such service is not persecution. 
34 The lack of an objection to such service could however negate the required 
subjective fear of persecution required in order to qualify as a refugee.  Also, the 
performance of such service could lead to complying conscript being excluded from 
protection as a refugee under Article 1(F) of the 1951 Convention.  For a case 
its basic illegal character and is independent of the claimant’s actions and motives: 
 
We are all of the view that the Board erred when it concluded that the 
appellant’s fear was of “prosecution” rather than “persecution”.  Simply 
stated, the refusal to carry out military orders, which have no legal 
foundation, cannot give rise to a fear of prosecution – which implies one is 
dealing with a valid law of general application.  Rather, such inaction on 
the part of the appellant could well be regarded as giving rise to 
persecution . . .35  
 
While such per se persecution would normally nonetheless require a nexus to the 
enumerated grounds of the 1951 Convention, it would appear, as discussed further below, 
that some of the jurisprudence considers these categories of prohibited compulsory 
military service to have an automatic nexus to political opinion.  The terminology used 
by the jurisprudence embodies the idea of an implicit nexus (albeit as much to religion as 
to political opinion): “selective conscientious objector”36.  
 
The automatically prohibited forms of compulsory military service can be categorized 
according to the source of the prohibition: military service prohibited due to the nature of 
the conscripted action; military service prohibited due to the nature of the conscriptor; 
and, military service prohibited due to the fundamental nature of the conscriptee.  Each of 
these categories of prohibited military service will be discussed in sequence below.  
i. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE PROHIBITED DUE TO 
THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY ACTION 
 
Firstly, some forms of compulsory military service are prohibited due to the nature of the 
military action that the conscript will be required to perform.  The most clear example of 
excluded military service is military service where the conscript will be forced to perform 
an act which is “condemned by the international legal community as contrary to basic 
rules of human conduct”37  
 
This category clearly includes participation in military actions in violation of established 
                                                                                                                                                 
questioning this proposition, see Sladoljej v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] (FCTD). 
35 Mohamed v. Canada (MEI) [1994] F.C.J. No. 1654 (FCA) (orally) at ¶ 2. 
36 See fn. 87, infra.  Most recently, see Bakir v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2004] F.C.J. 
No. 57 (FC) at ¶ 30.  In my view, the term “selective conscientious objector” (sometimes 
referred to as a “partial objector”) is inappropriate.  Unlike “absolute” conscientious 
objectors, the focus of the analysis of “partial” is external to the claimant: the nature of 
the military action and the nature of the conscriptor.  As noted previously, it is even 
doubtful that, in law, the claimant need to oppose the conscription in question (although 
the claimant’s flight from his or her country of origin would seem to, in practice, require 
this) 
37 UNHCR Handbook para. 171 quoted with approval in Zolfagharkhani at ¶ 30 in 
the decision of MacGuigan, J.A. 
international law, including the use of chemical weapons38, the widespread commission 
of “atrocities” and the participation in a war of aggression explicitly condemned by the 
Security Council.39  However, this category may also include actions not necessarily in 
violation of international law but otherwise “condemned” by the international 
community, including the commission of “reprehensible acts against one’s countrymen”40 
and the senseless perpetuation of a civil war.41  Arguably the leading case on military 
service evasion, Zolfarghkahni, falls into this later type of  condemned but not 
necessarily illegal actions.42
 
It is unclear whether evidence must establish that the claimant will personally be party to 
the performance of such prohibited military service or simply that the military in question 
generally performs such prohibited actions.43  Certainly, the jurisprudence establishes that 
                                                 
38 Zolfagharkhani (See fn. 42 for a critique of this categorization; notwithstanding 
this critique, at the present time the use of chemical weapons is prohibited by treaty if not 
by customary international law.) 
39 Al-Maisri v. Canada (MEI), [1995] F.C.J. No. 642 (FCA) 
40 Ciric v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1993] F.C.J. No. 1277 (FCTD) (at ¶23: “sickening 
activity”) and Bouchaib v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2000] F.C.J. No. 1839 (FCTD) (at ¶7: 
“reprehensible acts”), respectively. 
41 Basic v. Canada (M.C.I.) [1994] F.C.J. No. 1368 (FCTD) (the claimant feared 
conscription into the Croatian military, at ¶ 5: “He told the Board ‘there is a foolishness 
going on there and I do not want to participate in that’”). 
42 The Court of Appeal is ambiguous as to whether the use of the chemical 
weapons in question in an internal conflict was actually a violation of international law at 
the time of the events in question.  The Court of Appeal states at ¶ 29 that “[o]n the basis 
of the evidence in the record, it is impossible to say with scientific certainty that the gases 
in question in the case at bar would be included in these Convention definitions . . . I 
believe that all that is necessary to dispose of the instant case, however, is evidence of the 
total revulsion of the international community to all forms of chemical warfare”.  
However, the Court of Appeal later notes, almost in passing, at ¶ 30, that “ the use of 
chemical weapons should now be considered to be against international customary law”.  
Ironically, in support of this latter proposition the Court of Appeal cites the negotiation of 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/RES/47/39).  However, the 
Convention had only been opened for negotiations six months previously and entered into 
force four years after the Court of Appeal’s decision and many years after the events 
giving rise to the claimants flight from his country.  While it can be argued that the Court 
of Appeal was nonetheless correct with respect to its argument that chemical warfare was 
nonetheless in violation of customary international law, the Court of Appeal’s cursory 
attention to the subject strongly suggests that it was indeed applying the less rigorous 
standard of “revulsion of the international community” rather than the stricter standard of 
violation of international law.    
43 Radosevic v. Canada (M.C.I.) [1995] F.C.J. No. 74 (FCTD) (suggests that a 
conscript unlikely to be forced to commit atrocities that are  otherwise commonplace will 
not receive protection, at ¶ 2, quoting with approval the Board’s decision, “Even if the 
the “normal” sporadic occurrence of prohibited actions in war, unrelated to the claimant, 
will not render the military service prohibited.44  Some of the jurisprudence requires a 
claimant to establish that the state condones the illicit military activity in question.45  The 
jurisprudence on complicity (arising out of the application of the exclusion clauses) 
would presumably apply to this determination: only if the claimant would be complicit in 
prohibited military actions would the compulsion of his military service be prohibited.46  
However, the jurisprudence has thus far made no explicit linkage of the prohibition of 
this type of military service to complicity in the actions in question.  The implications of 
linking this type of prohibited military service with the notion of complicity will be 
discussed below at length. 
 
The Canadian jurisprudence invites the application of the doctrine of complicity to this 
category of prohibited military service since the jurisprudence itself frequently cites the 
need to avoid forced complicity as the policy rationale for finding this category of 
military service to be prohibited.  However, the law on complicity is not very helpful to a 
claimant fearing prohibited military service.  Historically, complicity will generally not 
be attributed to those “who were drafted by the State for membership”47  While mere 
membership in an organization may sometimes render an individual complicit, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
panel were to accept that if the claimant returned to Serbia that he would be required to 
serve as a reservist in the Serbian army, based on the overall reading of the evidence, the 
panel does not find that there is a serious possibility that the claimant would be forced to 
commit crimes against humanity in Serbia today.”) 
44 Popov v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1994] F.C.J. No. 489 (at ¶ 5: It is true that the 
evidence contains accounts of violations from time to time, or allegations, at least, of 
violations from time to time.  And one would not be too surprised if the allegations were 
substantiated.  But an isolated incident or incidents of the violation of international 
standards is not the kind of activity which the Federal Court of Appeal was referring to in 
the jurisprudence which has been cited.  One is talking about military activity which is 
condoned in a  general way by the state, by the military forces.  One thinks of places like 
El Salvador.”) 
45 T99-04510 (CRDD, 2 November 1999) (at ¶ 10: “The panel notes that military 
operations are not characterized as contravening international standards if there are only 
isolated violations of these standards.  Instead, the panel notes that there must be 
offending military activity by the military forces which is condoned in a general way by 
the state.”) 
46 The exclusion clauses of the 1951 Convention (Articles 1(F)(a) and 1(F)(c)), as 
imported into Canadian law by s. 98 of IRPA, bar from protection as a refugee anyone 
who has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity; or 
anyone who has, been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.  As a result of these exclusion clauses, a significant jurisprudence has emerged 
outlining the circumstances which a claimant can be found to be “complicit” in an 
excluded activity and thereby barred from protection as a refugee. 
47 Grahl-Madsen referring to the post-Second World War International Military 
Tribunal, as quoted in Ramirez v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (FCA); followed in 
Canada (M.C.I.) v. Ashedom, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1350 (FCTD). 
should be seen as an exception and does not generally apply to a conscript in the 
conscripted armed forces of a state.48  The facts of Zolfarghani have been interpreted as 
requiring “reasons of an extremely serious nature” in order for a finding of prohibited 
military service.49  This is not to say that this condition can never be satisfied; given the 
horrific actions of many militaries around the world the unfortunate reality is that service 
in many militaries may qualify. 50
 
The law governing complicity differentiates between “continuous and regular” acts and 
“isolated incidents.”51  In both cases, complicity will occur only through “personal and 
knowing participation” in the acts in question.  However, in the former case of 
widespread prohibited actions, such participation will be inferred from mere membership 
in the organization: 
 
As I understand the jurisprudence, it is that a person who is a member of 
the persecuting group and who has knowledge that activities are being 
committed by the group and who neither takes steps to prevent them 
occurring (if he has the power to do so) nor disengages himself from the 
group at the earliest opportunity (consistent with safety for himself) but 
who lends his active support to the group will be considered to be an 
accomplice. A shared common purpose will be considered to exist.52
 
However, applying the doctrine of complicity to the determination of when conscription 
into the military is prohibited is not without problems.  The test for complicity has been 
developed in exclusion jurisprudence – a jurisprudence which is generally favorable to 
the claimant given the gravity of excluding an individual who would otherwise be offered 
protection as a refugee.  However, in applying the complicity test to a category of 
prohibited military service, the test is being moved from the determination of exclusion to 
the determination of inclusion.  The sympathy to the claimant which is appropriate for 
                                                 
48 Moreno v. Canada (M.E.I.) 1 F.C. 298 (FCA);  
49 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1997) (adopting the model of “partial objector”, 
the Board states “the partial service to which the conscientious objector opposes must be 
for reasons of an extremely serious nature”) 
50 Fear of conscription into military service in a military committing widespread 
prohibited actions is enough to establish a refugee claim without any further proof of the 
conscripts likely involvement in these prohibited actions according to TA0-05919 
(CRDD, 30 April 2001) at ¶4 and ¶5 (the Board seems to accept compelled service in the 
Rwandan military as a valid basis of claim; however, the Board did not believe that the 
claimant would be subject to conscription, at ¶ 15). 
51 Penate v. Canada (MEI) [1993] F.C.J. No. 1292 at ¶ 6.  The category of 
“isolated incidents” is also referred to as  
52 Ibid. at ¶ 6.  The test set out in Penate also requires the individual to “[lend] his 
active support to the group”.  However, in the case of a conscript, this aspect of the test is 
irrelevant since the entire purpose of conscripting an individual is to require him to take 
an active role in the organization in question.  A conscript is almost never an inactive 
member of the military. 
exclusion is less appropriate for inclusion.  It is possible that a claimant who desserts 
midway through a conflict could be found not complicit for the purposes of exclusion but 
nonetheless complicit for the purposes of inclusion through a prohibited form of 
compulsory military service.53  In addition, some of  prohibited acts in question are acts 
in which it is very difficult to have personal complicity.  For example, with respect to 
types of actions “condemned by the international legal community”, it is analytically 
difficult to apply the doctrine of complicity to conscripts engaged in the waging of a 
“non-defensive incursion into foreign territory”.54
 
Nonetheless, complicity is a useful concept when evaluating a claim of persecution based 
upon conscription into a prohibited military action.  However, returning to the view that 
the forced performance of a prohibited category of military service is per se persecutory, 
it would be useful to apply the tool of state protection in conjunction with complicity 
rather than relying solely upon that of complicity.  As noted previously, state protection 
need not be perfect.  Thus, where a state does not condone or facilitate the prohibited 
actions and there is an established mechanism for preventing, reporting and punishing the 
commission of prohibited acts, it would appear very difficult to establish a risk of 
prohibited military service due to the nature of military action.  In order to succed, in 
such a situation, a claimant would have to present, in the language of Ward, “clear and 
compelling evidence” of the state’s inability to prevent the claimant from becoming 
complicit in such prohibited actions. 
 
However, in situations where the state condones, encourages or acquiesces in the 
prohibited actions, the presumption of state protection is automatically rebutted due to the 
nature of the persecutor: the state itself.  In such a case, the claimant would merely have 
to establish that there is a serious possibility of becoming complicit in such prohibited 
actions in order to render his compulsory military service prohibited.   
 
Needless to say, the difference between the first and second categories of situations is one 
of degree rather than category.  In all cases, a determination of complicity must be 
performed in a pragmatic manner55 - in other words such a determination should give the 
benefit of any doubt to the claimant. 
 
There is also some suggestion that any punishment for refusal to participate in this type 
of prohibited military service will constitute persecution.56  However, a more 
                                                 
53 This was the case in T99-02481 et al. (CRDD, 29 May 2000) where the 
claimant was found not be excluded due to his involvement in the siege of Vukovar by 
the Yugoslav army but was found to be at risk of a prohibited form of conscription in 
relation to the conflict in Kosovo. 
54 Al-Maisri v. Canada (MEI) [1995] F.C.J. No. 642 at ¶ 6 (quoting Hathaway’s 
use of the term). 
55 This comment flows from the Court of Appeal’s criticism of the Board in 
Zolfagharkhanbi for its “naïve and unrealistic” distinction it between “participation and 
non-participation in military activity” (at ¶ 26). 
56 T99-04510 (CRDD, 2 November 1999) (at ¶ 11: “Nor is there persecution if the 
conventional approach would be to consider whether the punishment in question is a 
serious violation of the claimant’s human rights.  Given the context of punishment for 
failing to comply with prohibited conscription – the punishment of an essentially 
“innocent” man for failing to comply with an illegal act – it is likely that anything more 
than brief imprisonment would constitute persecution.  In any case, this issue is usually 
moot as punishment for failure to comply with prohibited conscription usually also 
includes renewed forced enrollment in the military. 
 
As for nexus, as noted at the outset of this discussion, the jurisprudence often reads 
political opinion into evasion of prohibited forms of compulsory military service.  This 
most often happens through the assumption that the state would impute a political 
opinion to an opponent of such prohibited military service.  Such was the case in 
Zolfgharkhani: 
 
There can be no doubt that the appellant's refusal to participate in the 
military action against the Kurds would be treated by the Iranian 
government as the expression of an unacceptable political opinion.57
 
This direct equation of refusal to perform prohibited military service and a nexus to 
political opinion has been repeated in subsequent jurisprudence.58  Such an imputation is 
logical given the desperate circumstances – and heightened political passions - which 
produce prohibited conscription; such an environment fosters a “your either with us or 
against us” mentality. However, some of the jurisprudence also suggests that any 
opposition to a prohibited form of military service will be in some way inherently 
political.  Even Zolfagharkhani at times suggests this possibility: 
 
The probable use of chemical weapons, which the Board accepts as a fact, 
is clearly judged by the international community to be contrary to basic 
rules of human conduct, and consequently the ordinary Iranian 
conscription law of general application, as applied to a conflict in which 
Iran intended to use chemical weapons, amounts to persecution for 
political opinion.59
 
                                                                                                                                                 
penalties for refusing to serve are not harsh, except perhaps where the refusal to serve 
occurs in the context of a military operation condemned as contrary to basic rules of 
human conduct.” [Emphasis added]) 
57 Zolfagharkhani at ¶ 32.  See also fn. 5 in Moreno v. Canada (MEI) [1994] 1 
F.C. 298 (FCA).  Most recently, this point has been reiterated in Ates v. Canada (MCI) 
[2004] F.C.J. No. 1599 (FC) at ¶ 16 et seq. 
58 In T95-06356 (CRDD, 30 September 1997) the Board, referring to an inherent 
nexus  to political opinion, states at ¶ 37: “[I]n Zolfagharkhani the Federal Court of 
Appeal specifically recognized that persecution which a claimant faces because of a 
refusal to perform military service is linked to the ground set out in the definition of 
Convention refugee.” 
59 Ibid. at ¶ 30. 
The linkage between prohibited military service and political opinion in the jurisprudence 
can be traced back to the Ciric decision of the Federal Court Trial Division whereby the 
refusal of a Serbian couple to be conscripted into their country’s horrific civil war was 
found to be an inherently political act: 
 
Accordingly the issue before the panel in Ciric was whether there was 
evidence of the conflict being "condemned by the international community 
as contrary to basic rules of human conduct" as set out in paragraph 171 of 
the UNHCR Handbook. On this basis, the refusal to serve in Ciric was an 
expression of political opinion and the conscription law was viewed not as 
a law of general application but a law of persecutory effect.60
 
This line of cases finds support in the remarks of Goodwin-Gill.61  However, this line of 
cases is likely to come under increasing challenge in the future.62  Furthermore, insofar as 
the Canadian jurisprudence interprets all enumerated grounds fairly broadly, the lack of 
an implicit political opinion is not necessarily fatal to such claims.63
                                                 
60 Varga v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] F.C.J. No. 888 (FCTD) referring to Ciric v. 
Canada (MEI) [1993] F.C.J. No. 1277 (FCTD).  As noted in the quotation, Ciric was 
arguably decided on an evidentiary issue (the appropriate evidentiary threshold for 
establishing that a conflict is “condemned by the international community”) and not 
directly on the issue of whether some types of military service evasion is inherently 
political. 
61 Goodwin-Gill states in The Refugee in International Law (1983) at 33 and 34: 
“Military service and objection thereto, seen from the point of view of the state, are 
issues which go to the heart of the body politic. Refusal to bear arms, however motivated, 
reflects an essentially political opinion regarding the permissible limits of state authority, 
it is a political act.”  This comment by Goodwin-Gill has been approvingly referenced in 
Zolfagharkhani.  See also T95-06356 (CRDD, 30 September 1997),  
62 The questioning of the existence of an inherent nexus in cases of prohibited 
compulsory military service is likely to increase given that the RPD’s expanded 
jurisdiction now allows the Board to grant relief to military service evaders without nexus 
to an enumerated ground.  For an example of how this expanded scope of relief may 
affect judicial reasoning on this issue, see Volovich; Ustaoglu v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2003] 
F.C.J. No. 1285 (FC) at ¶ 11 and Kilic v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 84 (FC) at ¶ 
29.. 
63 As noted at the outset of this discussion of nexus and prohibited conscription, 
an explicit nexus can often be found to political opinion given the heightened political 
perceptions that often coexist with prohibited conscription.  In addition, the category of 
“membership in a particular social group” can be used as a nexus for some individuals 
fearing prohibited conscription, see implicitly in T92-02882  (CRDD, 23 June 1992), 
U95-04027 (CRDD, 27 August 1996) and Andrade v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2002] F.C.J. No. 
69 (FCTD)  and T87-9024, (IAB, 29 July 1987).  However, it would seem from the 
jurisprudence that membership in a particular social group is more often cited in cases 
where conscription is prohibited due to the nature of the conscriptor.  For a contrary 
view, see V91-00261 (CRDD, 28 June 1991) (orally) 
ii. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE PROHIBITED DUE TO 
THE NATURE OF THE CONSCRIPTOR 
 
Secondly, there is some Canadian jurisprudence to suggest that some forms of military 
service are prohibited due to the nature of the conscriptor.64  The jurisprudence suggests 
that while national governments may have a prima facie right to conscript individuals 
within their territory, such a right does not extend to non-state actors.65  However, the 
Canadian jurisprudence is far from unanimous on this topic.66  It is the non-state nature of 
the conscriptor that leads to the prohibition of their conscription; notwithstanding the 
prohibited nature of the conscriptor, the internationally condemned nature of the military 
action in which it is engaged may also result in the prohibition of conscription.67   
 
With respect to conscriptors, the jurisprudence provides no guidance on how to determine 
whether a particular conscriptor is legitimate – whether it can be considered as a “state” 
conscriptor.  As of the present time, the jurisprudence in support of this prohibition has 
involved conscription by groups that are clearly not recognized governments: the South 
Lebanese Army, the LTTE guerillas of Sri Lanka, and the Colmbian FARC rebels.  The 
jurisprudence regarding groups of more ambiguous status is decidedly mixed.68  There is 
                                                 
64 It is unclear whether the second and third categories of prohibited military 
service are sub-categories of “contrary to the basic rules of human conduct” (see for 
example T99-09172 (CRDD, 1 August 2001) at ¶49) or separate categories.   
65 A95-01130 (CRDD, 7 February 1997) (concerning the South Lebanese Army at 
¶16: “Given the SLA’s lack of legal status, there is no issue in regard to enforcement of a 
law of general application.”)  
66 See Diab v. Canada (MEI) [1994] F.C.J. No. 1277 (FCA), VA0-00816 (CRDD, 
19 February 20001), Nagendiran v. Canada (MCI), [2003] F.C.J. No. 807, M89-04337 
(CRDD, 26 June 1990) and T90-04331 (CRDD, 17 October 1990) for cases where the 
illegitimacy of the conscriptor rendered the required military service unlawful.  However, 
see T99-09172 (CRDD, 1 August 2001) for a decision regarding conscription by the 
Taleban in Afghanistan that did not cite its illegitimacy as a reason for conscription to 
constitute persecution and also U91-08581 et al. (CRDD, 19 February 1992) for a 
decision that found conscription by the Mujadehin in Afghanistan not to constitute 
persecution. 
67 T99-09172 (CRDD, 1 August 2001) (at ¶ 49: “In this case, the claimant objects 
to forced conscription by the Taliban . . . The panel considered his objection to be serious 
given that the military actions objected to are judged by the international community to 
be contrary to basic rules of human conduct”).  However, non-state actors will not be 
presumed by their nature to be committing condemned acts (or acts leading to exclusion).  
See El-Hasbani v. Canada (M.E.I.), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1269 at ¶ 42 (“The respondent 
submits that armed liberation organizations such as the SLA fall within the category of 
the type of organizations which have committed crimes against humanity as part of their 
mandate and incidental to their regular operations. . . . This is not proof of anything!”) 
68 See for example the jurisprudence on Afghanistan noted in fn.66, supra.  See 
also TA1-15461 (RPD, 18 February 2003) at ¶33 et seq. (finding the unelected 
government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan to be a legitimate conscriptor) 
also some jurisprudence to suggest that even military service compelled by national 
governments will not be considered “state” conscription if the government is acting 
outside of its municipal legislative or executive framework.69  Under this approach, 
“impressment” would constitute per se persecution.   
 
The comments made with respect to nexus for military service prohibited by the nature of 
the action also apply to the present situation.  However, as noted previously, membership 
in a particular social group is also commonly cited in the jurisprudence for this category 
of prohibited conscription.70  Furthermore, the Canadian jurisprudence, as noted in the 
initial discussion of nexus, allows “neutrality” to provide a nexus to political opinion.  On 
the facts, most non-state conscriptors view individuals who do not agree to be conscripted 
as political opponents.   
 
Punishment for resisting this type of conscription is almost never an issue as the nature of 
the conscriptor renders all punishment extrajudicial.  Generally, on the facts, 
“punishment” for resisting conscription consists either of death or enforced conscription 
under even more unfavorable conditions.    
iii. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE PROHIBITED DUE TO 
THE NATURE OF THE CONSCRIPT 
 
Thirdly, some forms of military service are prohibited due to the nature of the individual 
being targeted for conscription.71  The only category of individuals who have thus far 
been identified in the jurisprudence as absolutely prohibited from being conscripted are 
children.  The conscription of children constitutes per se persecution: 
 
I believe that there is a reasonable chance the younger claimant [17 years 
of age] would be forcibly recruited by either the military or the guerillas 
and hence there is a reasonable chance that he would face persecution if he 
returns to his country of nationality.  Thus I am satisfied that this 
claimant’s fear of persecution in his country of nationality is well-founded 
by reason of his membership in a particular social group, namely, 
Salvadoran minors who are at risk of forcible and unlawful recruitment.72
                                                 
69 T89-05508 (CRDD, 28 March 1991) and T90-07001 et al. (CRDD, 22 
November 1991, S. G. Sri-Skanda-Rajah) (“Compulsory military service . . . is not a 
lawful requirement” where no special law had been promulgated despite a constitutional 
provision requiring such a law to be promulgated).  However, for a contrary view, see 
V89-00064 (CRDD, 8 June 1989, C. Groos) (“However, even an illegal act [random 
arrest and detention] in apprehending the claimant does not necessarily mean his 
obligation to perform military service was avoided or that any subsequent steps taken by 
the Honduran military were illegal”) 
70 See fn. 63, supra. 
71 See comment at fn. 64, supra. 
72 T90-07001 et al. (CRDD, 22 November 1991, D. Walker).  See also 
Poologanathan v. Canada (MEI) [1996] F.C.J. No. 987 (FCTD) (although dealing with 
 
Surprisingly, the jurisprudence on this topic makes no reference to the recent 
developments on the topic in international law nor to the plethora of international 
research, instruments and resolutions on this topic.73  Although seldom explicitly stated, 
the nexus in the case of child soldiers is their membership in a particular social group.  
 
Conscientious objectors can also be seen as a subtype of individuals whose compelled 
military service is prohibited due to the nature of the conscriptee.  In the case of a 
conscientious objector, the prohibition arises out of the beliefs of the conscriptee.  
However, unlike child soldiers, the beliefs of the conscientious objector are not inherent 
and immutable.  For this reason, and the more practical reason that the jurisprudence 
deals with conscientious objectors as a separate type of military service evader, 
conscientious objectors to military service will be dealt with separately. 
 
It is not completely clear whether the prohibition of the conscription of children relates to 
their special status in law as children or simply to particular international instruments 
prohibiting their conscription.  The aforementioned lack of reference to international law 
in the jurisprudence on conscription of children suggests the latter.  If this is indeed the 
case, the prohibition may also be extended to include other special groups identified in 
                                                                                                                                                 
errors of fact by the Board, the Court’s analysis assumed that the conscription of a nine 
year old, albeit by guerillas, provided the basis for a refugee claim); and, V98-01920 
(CRDD, 13 March 2000) and A99-00710 (CRDD, 19 February 2002).  See also 
Mohammed v. Canada (MCI) [1995] F.C.J. No. 1457 (FCTD) where it was strongly 
suggested that the conscription of children was contrary to international law (and 
certainly otherwise contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN).  The recent 
decision in Suresh v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2000] F.C.J. No. 5 (F.C.A.) at ¶ 38 to 40 also 
identifies the conscription of children, inter alia, as an indicator of unlawful activity 
(while the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision was subsequently overturned by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3 (SCC), the Supreme Court did not 
disagree with the Court of Appeal’s finding on this matter). 
73 Developments in international law include the ILO’s Convention 182: On the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour 38 I.L.M. 1207 (1999) (entered into force 19 Nov. 2000), 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 
7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000) (entered into force 12 February 2002) and Articles 
8(2)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court U.N. 
Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002)..  For a review of these 
developments, see UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2005: Childhood Under 
Threat (UNICEF, Geneva, 2005) esp. Chapter 3 (39 to 66), Amy Beth Abbott "Child 
Soldiers: The Use of Children as Instruments of War" Suffolk Transnational Law Review 
499 (Summer 2000), Michael S. Gallagher “Soldier Boy Bad: Child Soldiers, Culture and 
Bars to Asylum” 13 Int J Refugee Law 310 (July 2001), and Wendy Perlmutter “An 
Application of Refugee Law to Child Soldiers” 6 Geo. Public Pol'y Rev. 137 (Spring 
2001).  Interestingly, the scholarly treatment of child soldiers seeking asylum similarly 
presumes persecution without any explicit linkage to international law.  
international law, including the mentally and physically disabled74; indigenous peoples; 
and the elderly.  There is some support in international law for prohibiting the 
conscription of mentally and physically disabled individuals.75  Of course, for practical 
reasons of military efficiency, the disabled are highly unlikely to be the focus of military 
recruitment efforts.  The situation with respect to indigenous peoples is more ambiguous.  
While international law requires that “special measures” be taken to ensure governmental 
actions “[safeguard] the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment 
of the peoples concerned,”76 international law also allows for “compulsory personal 
services”, presumably such as compulsory military service where it is required of the 
citizenry in general.77,  . . .  in cases prescribed by law for all citizens.  Furthermore, 
notwithstanding a large number of cases involving the conscription of indigenous 
individuals, no mention has been made in the jurisprudence of indigenous status as a 
ground of prohibition of conscription.78  With respect to the elderly, the situation is 
analogous to that of the disabled: there is some support for the prohibition of conscription 
of the elderly, .79 but military efficiency suggests that it is unlikely to occur in any case.80
                                                 
74 The term “disabled” is taken, without comment on its appropriateness, from the 
international instruments. 
75 See the emphasis on the rehabilitation and special accommodation of the 
disabled in Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. res. 2856 
(XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); the Declaration 
on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. res. 3447 (XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); and, Part I and II of the Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, A/RES/48/96, 85th Plenary 
Meeting 20 December 1993.  Insofar as compulsory military service may interfere with 
the rehabilitation and special accommodation of the disabled, it may be prohibited. 
76 See Article 4 of the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 
5, 1991. 
77 Ibid.  Article 11. 
78 See for example U95-04027 (CRDD, 27 August 1996) where the claimant 
claimed a fear of conscription “as a young male Guatemalan fearing forced conscription”.  
While mistreatment during military service was feared as a “member of the Maya 
Quiche”, his indigenous status was not linked to his fear of conscription per se. 
79 See Article 3 of United Nations Principles for Older Persons, G.A. Res. 46/91, 
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 74th plen. mtg., Annex 1 U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/91 (1991) which 
allows the elderly  “to participate in determining when and at what pace withdrawal from 
the labour force takes place”.  Insofar as compulsory military service can be understood 
as contradicting the elderly individual’s determination to retire from the workforce, it 
may be understood as prohibited.  
80 Military inefficiency may not be a complete bar to the recruitment of the 
elderly.  In the matter of Nagendiran v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2003] F.C.J. No. 807 the 
Federal Court overturned the Board’s finding that it was “implausible” that the elderly 
would be recruited.  No mention was made of a prohibition of the recruitment of the 
elderly in either the Board’s decision or the decision of the Court.  However, the 
“elderly” man in this case was only 52 years of age. 
B. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 
 
Notwithstanding the state’s general right to compel an individual to perform military 
service, there is a category of individuals who may not be compelled to perform such 
service.  These individuals are known in the jurisprudence as “conscientious objectors” – 
although the term and its usage is fraught with inconsistency.  The term conscientious 
objector in this section will be used to refer to the subset of military service evaders who 
articulate their evasion of military service in terms of their underlying political and 
religious views.81
 
The ability of an individual, including a refugee, to claim conscientor objector status is 
the subject of much debate in the scholarly literature, in international law and in the 
jurisprudence of other jurisdictions.82  Notwithstanding this controversy, the Canadian 
jurisprudence quietly assumes - but also heavily restricts - the right to conscientiously 
object to military service.83  The first mention of conscientious objection in the refugee 
case-law is a good illustration of this approach.  In its decision in Musial the Court of 
Appeal both implicitly recognizes conscientious objection as a valid ground of refugee 
protection and rejects the claimant’s attempts to bring himself within the narrow limits of 
the term: 
 
While the Board's reasons, which were dated some three weeks after the 
decision was pronounced, are perhaps ineptly expressed and give the 
impression that in the Board's view army deserters and conscientious 
objectors do not fall within the definition, I do not read the reasons as 
meaning anything more than that army deserters and conscientious 
objectors are not, as such, within the definition.  That is, as I see it, far 
from saying that because a person is an army deserter or a conscientious 
objector he cannot be a Convention refugee and I do not think the Board 
has made any such ruling.  What the Board appears to me to have done is 
to point out that army deserters and conscientious objectors are not dealt 
                                                 
81 While the Board must not be restricted in its determination of a claim to the 
particular pleadings of the claimant, in the case of conscientious objectors it is impossible 
to conceive of a situation where the Board could confer refugee status on a claimant on 
the basis of being a conscientious objector without the claimant having specifically 
articulated such objections. 
82 Such a complex and extended debate is impossible to summarize.  In essence, 
there is some controversy over whether the Article 18 of the ICCPR along with the UN 
Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 22 on the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (which interprets Article 18 of the ICCPR to restrict the right of 
states to conscript under Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the ICCPR) overrides a state’s sovereign 
customary ability to conscript individuals into military service.  With respect to the 
refugee jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, and for a contrary view of the existence of a 
right to conscientious objection, see most notably Sepet. 
83 An exception to this proposition is the matter of T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 
1995) which reviews briefly the international legal basis of conscientious objection. 
with as such by the definition and then to go on to consider the applicant's 
case on its merits, including the applicant's motives, and to conclude that 
in the case before it, the applicant's objection to serving in Afghanistan, if 
called upon to do so, was not sufficient to differentiate his case from the 
case of any other draft evader and thus to form its opinion that there were 
not reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant's claim for Convention 
refugee status could be established.84
 
The significance, and drawbacks, of this quiet assumption of a right to conscientious 
objection will be discussed further in the analysis.  According to the Canadian 
jurisprudence, the right to conscientious objection requires a deep seated ethical or 
religious objection to all forms of military service: 
 
The panel begins its assessment of the claimant's assertion that he is a 
conscientious objector in need of protection with a few general 
observations about the panel's understanding of what is meant by the term 
"conscientious objection".  "Conscience", in the panel's opinion, refers to a 
person's genuine convictions which spring from one's political opinion, 
religious beliefs or philosophical tenets.85
 
Although not directly addressed in the jurisprudence, atheism may preclude conscientious 
objection.86  
 
The right to conscientious objection exists only in absolute form; a “partial” 
conscientious objection will not bring a claimant protection.  As noted previously, while 
the case-law makes mention of “partial objection”, this label is applied not to situations 
where the claimant believes the particular war is against his conscience but rather to 
situations where the military action is “condemned by the international community.” 87  
                                                 
84 Musial v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1982] 1 F.C. 290 (FCA) at ¶ 7.  In an immigration 
context, conscientious objection was raised many years before Musial in the matter of 
Boulis v. Canada (M.M.I) [1974] S.C.R. 875 (SCC) (on the issue of whether a statutory 
body had properly exercised its discretion in refusing a stay of deportation to a 
conscientious objector). 
85 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) 
86 See VA2-02269 (RPD, 23 September 2003) where the claimant, an atheist, was 
found not to be credible about his conscientious objection.   
87 See fn. 36, supra.  See for example T93-09377, (CRDD, 4 January 1995): “The 
purely pacifist conviction holds that it is morally wrong in all circumstances to bear arms 
and to kill; the partial pacifist conviction objects to the use of force in some 
circumstances depending upon the purposes or means used. . . . In the panel's opinion, to 
succeed on this leg [partial objection], the claimant must not only show that he holds the 
conviction that it is morally wrong to serve in the Occupied Territories but in addition, he 
must be able to demonstrate that the purposes for being sent to the Occupied Territories 
or the methods employed there would be condemned by the international community”.  
See also T92-01693 et al. (CRDD, 2 June 1993): “[T]his subjective finding would be 
In other words, “partial conscientious objection” has been removed from the real of 
conscience and placed into the realm of an objective assessment of the validity of military 
action. 
 
The conscientious objection must have an extra-personal foundation; fear of death or 
combat is insufficient to found a claim of conscientious objection.88  However, oddly, 
despite the preclusion of conscientious objection based upon fear of death during service, 
fear of death while on leave or otherwise hors de combat may allow a successful refugee 
claim: 
 
He also fears persecution in Algeria at the hands of armed Islamic 
extremists who have particularly targeted university educators with death 
and are still capable of carrying out such threats.  They had also targeted 
persons responding to conscription with death.  He believed that his only 
option was to leave the country and abandon his family and his university 
employment in order to avoid both groups.89
 
Ultimately, the distinction between in-service and out-of-service risk is a legalistic 
distinction; for a claimant, both types of risk of death are equally daunting.  The only way 
it can be understood is through the unstated presumption that while armed and 
performing service a conscript is receiving as much state protection as theoretically 
possible whereas while unarmed the conscript is receiving (on the facts in Algeria, or 
other countries in similar situations) inadequate state protection.   However this reasoning 
presupposes that risk of death while in military service would constitute persecution – a 
supposition that the jurisprudence has, to date, vehemently rejected.  The reasoning in the 
above-quoted claim and similar claims is perhaps the closest that the Canadian 
jurisprudence has come to consistently understanding those targeted for conscription as a 
particular social group. 
 
Since conscientious objection is an objection to military service it exists only where there 
                                                                                                                                                 
sufficient to characterize the husband as a partial conscientious objector, and proceed to 
the next step in the analysis.  . . . the next issue would be whether the type of military 
action engaged in by the IDF in the Occupied Territories is condemned by the 
international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.” Most recently, see 
Bakir v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2004] F.C.J. No. 57 (FC) at ¶ 30. 
88 T90-07001 (CRDD, 22 November 1991, decision of D. Winkler); T93-11144 et 
al. (CRDD, 14 June 1994) (“The male claimant testified that he does not want to kill or 
be killed.  To me this represents a fear of combat and . . . does not form the basis of a 
well-founded fear of persecution.”); VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 2003) (at ¶30: “What is 
clear is that the claimant is genuinely afraid of participation in the military sicne the 
recent Intifada.  In this the claimant has the sympathy of the panel.  However, this does 
not ground his claim for refugee status.”) 
89 V96-01788 (CRDD, 15 October 1997) at ¶ 5.  The claim was accepted, inter 
alia, on the basis of the quoted fear.  See also Mouazer v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. 
No. 423 which at ¶ 18 implicitly accepts fear of death while on leave as a  basis of claim. 
is no alternate civilian service available for conscientious objectors: “[i]f and when 
available, as here, alternative compulsory military service also does not a Convention 
refugee make”90  Often, the Board has required the claimant to avail himself of alternate 
service before seeking protection as a refugee – although this can also be seen as a test of 
the claimant’s credibility and subjective fear.91  More will be said about the topic of 
alternate service below. 
 
In practice, it is necessarily difficult to assess the truth of a claimant’s statement of 
conscience. Consequently, the Canadian jurisprudence has developed a process of 
assessment based largely upon (i) a claimant’s ability to articulate his objection, and (ii) 
his past actions.   With respect to the former, the claimant’s articulation of his beliefs, any 
articulation of conscience will be assessed for coherence and detail: 
 
The claimant testified that his religious beliefs preclude military service, 
but when asked (several times) to be specific about this, the claimant was 
hesitant in the extreme and was only able to offer rather vague 
generalities.  Such being the case, we do not believe that the claimant has 
any genuine religious convictions that preclude military service.92     
 
Notwithstanding the general importance of the articulation of his beliefs, in some cases, 
usually to the detriment of the claimant, this articulation is considered secondary to the 
                                                 
90 Kioreskou v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No. 457 at ¶ 15. 
91 VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 2003) (at ¶ 22: “In the panel’s view there are means 
the claimant could have utilized – but did not – to have avoided participation in the Israeli 
military from the very beginning.”); upheld by Volovich v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] 
F.C.J. No. 342 (at ¶ 5 and ¶ 6: “The Board notes, in addition, that despite his alleged fear, 
the applicant did not explore any alternatives to his military service and he never 
expressed his objection to that effect. As a result, the Board did not err in finding that the 
applicant's allegations on this point are unfounded. . . . he Board did consider that the 
applicant objected to the Israeli policy towards Palestinians. The Board did not ignore 
this element of the applicant's claim. Rather, the Board found that the applicant had 
neither expressed his objection to the Israeli policy nor had he established that it led to his 
personal persecution.”.  See also VA1-04412 for a linkage of a claimant’s failure to avail 
himself of alternate service possibilities with his subjective fear (at ¶ 28: “What is 
significant with respect to this case is that the claimant did not at any time seek the advice 
of conscientious objectors' organisations in order to see if there was a way in which he 
could avoid service in the military. Equally significant is that he never raised an objection 
with the military about performing his service . . . In the panel's view this is an indication 
that the claimant was not a conscientious objector. It also provides a basis for doubting 
whether his currently stated reasons for not wishing to serve in the reserve are for reasons 
of conscience.”)  
92 T93-01297 (CRDD, 17 November 1993); see also T91-01081 (CRDD, 2 
January 1982) (“The claimant had never manifested his belief and had not done anything 
to avoid military conscription, in spite of the fact that he . . . had been of draft age for six 
years.  The claimant also gave vague and inconsistent explanations of his beliefs . . . “) 
tenets of the organized religion to which he belongs.93   
 
With respect to the latter, a claimant’s past actions, there is an emerging line of cases that 
suggest that an claimant whose past actions knowingly places himself in a situation 
where military service will be required cannot claim protection as a refugee on that 
basis.94  These cases largely emerge out of the usually unsuccessful refugee claims of 
emigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Republics.  Such claims inevitably cite 
prospective military service in Israel as a basis of claim.95  In one such case, the Court 
noted that migrants who freely immigrate to a country requiring military service cannot 
then claim persecution on that basis: 
 
As the Board clearly pointed out, and as the transcript shows, the 
applicants knew that there was compulsory military service in Israel and 
nonetheless decided to immigrate to that country.96
 
This exclusion would rationally also apply to both individuals who have previously 
served in the military97 and individuals who volunteer for military service and then, 
                                                 
93 V89-00977 et al. (CRDD, 25 June 1990) (where the claimant’s belief that she 
should not participate in front-line military service conflicted with the stated beliefs of 
her church, the Seventh Day Adventists). 
94 Talman v. Canada (Solicitor General) [1995] F.C.J. No. 41 (FCTD) (hereafter 
“Talman”) (at ¶ 17 and 20: “I do not believe that the Refugee Division erred in its 
assessment of the evidence relating to the applicants' obligation to do military service.  
As the Board clearly pointed out, and as the transcript shows, the applicants knew that 
there was compulsory military service in Israel and nonetheless decided to immigrate to 
that country. . . . While recognizing the applicants' frustration, their conduct seems to me 
to have been simply a manoeuvre to establish the grounds for their claims.  I would say 
the same about their objections to military service even before they knew the rules and 
the exceptions.”).  See also Agranovski  v. Canada (M.C.I.) (FCTD, 1996).  While 
Agranovski reached a different conclusion, it nonetheless applied the same test of 
whether the claimant knowingly immigrated to a country with compulsory military 
service. 
95 The frustratingly identical nature of the claimants’ pleadings in these cases is 
matched only by the Board’s exceedingly generic responses to these claims.  The Israeli 
military service evasion cases include a quintet of decisions released within six months of 
each other that are almost completely verbatim identical: T93-02756 et al. (CRDD, 24 
Noevmber 1993); T93-06478 et al. (CRDD, 1 December 1993); T93-11519 et al. 
(CRDD, 11 May 1994); T93-11144 et al. (CRDD, 14 June 1994); and, T93-04356 
(CRDD, 17 June 1994).  Any reference in the notes to any of these cases can be read as a 
reference to all of these cases. 
96 Talman at ¶ 17. 
97 This line of cases emerges out of Popov  v.Canada (M.E.I.) [1994] F.C.J. No. 
489 and Prokopenkp [2000] F.C.J. No. 752 (FCTD) (implicitly at ¶ 5)  See also T93-
11519 et al. (CRDD, 11 May 1994) for an example of linking (albeit through a 
concomitant failure of the claimant to explain his objection) prior military service with an 
midway through their service, seek conscientious objector status.98  Ironically, it is often 
as a result of prior experience in the military that conscientious objectors form their 
objections.99
 
An exclusion from basing a claim on compulsory military service when the compulsion 
was self-inflicted makes sense as an evidentiary presumption.  The deliberate infliction of 
compulsory military service may indicate a subjective agreement with such service 
incompatible with the subjective fear required for a successful refugee claim.  Such a 
presumption is consistent with the similar presumption that an individual who has 
previously performed compulsory military service has no subjective fear of such 
service.100  However, while a logical presumption, such an exclusion makes no sense as a 
legal principle.  Unlike matters of equity, there is no requirement that a claimant come 
before the Board with “clean hands”.101
 
Unfortunately, this emerging exclusion is similar to the Canadian jurisprudence on sur 
place refugee claims based upon actions which knowingly create a risk of persecution.102  
However, there remains hope that the exclusion of individuals who knowingly inflict 
compulsory military service upon themselves will become simply an evidentiary 
presumption.103  It is unclear whether this emerging prohibition of claims based upon 
                                                                                                                                                 
inability to claim conscientious objector  status (“The male claimant testified that he 
served in the Red Army in the former Soviet Union from 1971 to 1973. . . . [h]e is not 
therefore a conscientious objector”).  More recently, see also VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 
2003) (at ¶25, in distinguishing a positive decision from the present case, the Board noted 
that the claimant “did serve and continued to do so right up until the time of the recent 
Intifada”); upheld by Volovich v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 342.  See also T93-
09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (where past military service is mentioned disparagingly). 
98 At the present time in Canada this type of claim has attracted a considerable 
amount of popular attention.  At least two US soldiers have sought protection in Canada 
in recent months as a result of, inter alia, their conscientious objection to participation in 
the war in Iraq. 
99 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“Between 1975 and 1977, the claimant 
served in the Soviet army in East Germany.  He testified that during this period he 
formed the view that bearing arms is morally wrong.”) 
100 See supra, at 27. 
101 The 1951 Convention explicitly recognizes this lack of a requirement by 
outlining, in Articles 1(E) and 1(F), categories of individuals who should be excluded 
from the protection they would otherwise deserve.  The analogy of this requirement to a 
new ground of “exclusion” is also found in the jurisprudence, see Talman at ¶ 8. 
102 However, see also U91-01411 (CRDD, 11 June 1991) (where the Board found 
the claimant’s sur place protests against, inter alia, conscription into a civil war sufficient 
to bring him protection as a refugee) 
103 Frisher v. Canada (M.C.I.) [1999] F.C.J. No. 603 (FCTD) (the reference to 
Talman at ¶ 5 is linked with a negative assessment of credibility).  T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 
January 1995) (the claimant’s alleged ignorance of Israeli compulsory military service 
when he immigrated was, inter alia, “not consistent with deeply held convictions against 
military service evasion applies to claims based upon prohibited forms of military 
service.104  Policy grounds alone would suggest that any exclusion should not be 
extended to include those claims.   
 
 
Other past actions which are assessed to determine the credibility of a claimant’s 
conscientious objection include the degree to which the claimant actively seeks to avoid 
compelled military service,105 the degree to which the claimant complies with directives 
to perform military service,106
 
The breach of the right to conscientious objection gives rise to refugee status only where 
the breach is serious enough to amount to persecution.  The breach normally takes the 
form of compelled service despite the conscientious objection or punishment for the 
conscientious objection must be serious enough as to amount to persecution.   
 
With respect to compelled service, it would be logical that anything more than a minimal 
amount of compelled service would amount to persecution.  Such a rule would be in 
keeping with the rule that a prohibited form of military service is per se persecutory.  
However, the case-law has been much less eager to extend this proposition to 
conscientious objectors. 
 
With respect to punishment, imprisonment for seven to forty-five days in humane 
conditions does not amount to persecution.107  Nor does a small fine, re-education and 
forced labour in addition to the compelled military service.108  An extension of service for 
three to six months is not persecutory.109 An extension of punishment from 10 to 24 
                                                                                                                                                 
bearing arms in all circumstances”)  
104 In his defense, the claimant in Talman, supra at fn. 96, asserted that he did not 
know that the military service in question was a prohibited form of military service (in 
his words, “directed against women and children” at ¶ 17).  The Court did not directly 
address this defense. 
105 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“He failed to find out more information 
from the military; he did not approach peace groups and he did not seek legal advice as to 
his position. In the panel's opinion, it was incumbent upon the claimant to investigate the 
options open to him.” 
106T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“The panel also considered the extent to 
which the claimant participated in the call-up process itself. bile he refused to attend for a 
medical and was forcibly examined by military doctors, he cooperated with the 
authorities when asked to come in for an interview on two occasions.”) 
107 T92-092-01693 et al. (CRDD, 2 June 1993) 
108 V99-02917 (CRDD, 22 December 1999) (the possible punishment is discussed 
at ¶ 32 to 37; the Board concluded at ¶53 that, in the alternative the claimant would be 
subject to conscription, the punishment “is not inordinate or beyond that acceptable 
within a human rights context for a law of general application”)    
109 C90-00462 et al. (CRDD, 16 October 1991) (out of a total period of service of 
24 months). 
months is persecutory.110  Repeated prosecution for failing to perform compulsory 
military service may be persecutory.111  Were military service evaders are rarely 
prosecuted, the claimant will not be able to gain status as such.112  Imprisonment for up to 
ten years is persecutory.113
 
As always in refugee claims, the claimant must establish that his conscientious objections 
will not be recognized by the government of the country of reference.  This can be 
demonstrated by a previous decision to refuse him status as a conscientious objector or by 
the refusal of the government to grant conscientious objector status to other similarly 
situated individuals.114     
 
A claimant’s failure to seek conscientious objector status can be cited as a failure to 
establish that he would be denied such status: 
 
What is more, there is no evidence that the Applicant claimed exemption 
from military service in Israel on the ground that he was a conscientious 
objector and was refused exemption from military service.  One would not 
be surprised to find that there are in Israel alternative methods of service 
for individuals falling into that category.  But that aside, we simply do not 
know and as I have said there is no evidence that he objected to serving in 
the military as a conscientious objector when he was in Israel, so what 
disposition might be made by the Israeli government in such a case is not 
known.115
 
Such a failure to make enquiries about conscientious objector status may also indicate a 
lack of subjective fear by the claimant and bring into doubt the genuineness of his 
conscientious objection.116
C. REFUGEE CLAIMS BASED UPON ANCILLARY FEATURES 
OF MILITARY SERVICE 
 
The remainder of military service evaders fall into the general category of individuals 
facing prima facie legitimate conscription.  The determination of whether the purportedly 
                                                 
110 VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 2003) at ¶ 25 (referring to T95-06356). 
111 Repeated prosecution refers to repeating the cycle of conscription and 
prosecution for failure to be conscripted.  T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“repeat 
prosecution might in certain circumstances become persecution”) 
112 T90-01685 (CRDD, 24 December 1990) 
113 T89-07396 (CRDD, 17 May 1990) 
114 However, with respect to similarly situated individuals, simply showing that 
the government “often” refuses to grant requests for conscientious objector status does 
not necessarily indicate it will do so in the case of the claimant (see Slavkovic v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No. 975 (FCTD) at ¶ 5). 
115 Popov at ¶ 8. 
116 Vakiriak v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1682 (FC) at ¶ 3 and ¶ 4. 
legitimate conscription is legitimate in each particular case rests on the particular facts of 
the case.. 
 
The framework of analysis that is applied is that derived from Zolfagharkani.  In arriving 
at its decision, the Court of Appeal  enunciated four principles of analysis that have been 
taken up and frequently reiterated by the subsequent jurisprudence: 
 
(1) The statutory definition of Convention refugee makes the intent (or 
any principal effect) of an ordinary law of general application, rather than 
the motivation of the claimant, relevant to the existence of persecution. 
 
(2) But the neutrality of an ordinary law of general application, vis-a-vis 
the five grounds for refugee status, must be judged objectively by 
Canadian tribunals and courts when required. 
 
(3) In such consideration, an ordinary law of general application, even in 
non-democratic societies, should, I believe, be given a presumption of 
validity and neutrality, and the onus should be on a claimant, as is 
generally the case in refugee cases, to show that the laws are either 
inherently or for some other reason persecutory. 
 
(4) It will not be enough for the claimant to show that a particular regime 
is generally oppressive but rather that the law in question is persecutory in 
relation to a Convention ground.117
 
With due respect to the Court of Appeal and to the subsequent jurisprudence, these four 
principles do not significantly advance or explain the jurisprudence on compulsory 
military service.  In some regards, these principles are contradicted by the jurisprudence.  
Certainly, conscientious objection is a good example of a law being judged improper 
because of effect rather than intent as suggested by the first rule.  Fortunately, the 
jurisprudence, adheres to these principles more in their quotation than in their application.  
As delicately noted in the Board’s own review of the jurisprudence applying the 
Zolfgaharkhani: “[t]he reader should bear in mind these ambiguities in the case law when 
reviewing the following observations on reasons-of-conscience claims.”.118
 
Thus, in approaching the issue of military service evasion, the law requiring conscription 
(and punishing its avoidance or any subsequent desertion) is prima facie an ordinary law 
of general application.  It is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be 
neutral with respect to the five enumerated grounds for refugee protection.  It is also 
assumed not to constitute persecution.  It is up to claimant to demonstrate, with respect to 
the law governing conscription or the actions of the government with respect to 
                                                 
117 Zolfagharkhani, at ¶ 19 to 22. 
118 IRB Interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition in the Case Law 
(Immigration and Refugee Board, Legal Services, Ottawa, December 2002) (as revised 
December 2003) at § 9.3.6. 
conscription, that the law or the government will discriminate in its actions on the basis 
of one of the five enumerated grounds for refugee protection and will thereby place the 
claimant at risk of persecution.  Surprisingly, although not inappropriately, nexus is often 
the key variable in the determination of refugee claims based upon ancillary features of 
military service. 
 
The first step in the rebuttal of the presumption that compulsory military service is a law 
of general application is establishing some form of discriminatory mistreatment.  
Logically, this mistreatment can occur before, during or after the compelled military 
service.  Each of these categories of discriminatory mistreatment have been discussed in 
the jurisprudence and will be discussed in sequence. 
i. DISCRIMINATORY RECRUITMENT 
 
The temporally earliest form of discriminatory treatment that can occur is discrimination 
in recruitment.  Such discrimination has been found to occur where the “law of general 
application” in fact targets “non-natural” groups within the society for conscription.119  
The targeting of rural and/or poor males for recruitment will constitute prohibited 
discrimination.120  Of course, where such discrimination is so severe as to constitute 
extralegal forced recruitment, the analysis of “impressment” as a form of prohibited 
compelled military service would be more appropriate. 
 
One seldom discussed feature of compulsory military service is the gendered nature of its 
object: the conscription of young males.121  Despite the obviously male focus of 
conscription, the gender bias of conscription is seldom raised as a discriminatory basis for 
recruitment.122  This is perhaps a consequence of the previously noted failure of the 
                                                 
119 T92-01693 et al. (CRDD, 2 June 1993) “Without entering into the quagmire of 
determining whether the inclusions and exclusions in the statute are reasonable and 
appropriate to its purposes, we do not believe that the class ‘Druze and Jews who are not 
Orthodox Jew full time Torah scholars’ can reasonably be characterized as natural.  It is a 
law arbitrary . . . . It does not flow from the inherent nature of military service, but 
contains a myriad of political, religious and ethnic considerations”.  However, see T93-
13420 (CRDD, 3 April 1996) at ¶ 66 for a different conclusion on the same law. 
120 T90-07001 et al. (CRDD, 22 November 1991, S. G. Sri-Skanda-Rajah) (“The 
poor and rural Salvadoran males between the ages of 14 and 30 are differentially targeted 
for forcible recruitment into the military service.”); V89-00064 (CRDD, 8 June 1989, G. 
S. Chrysomilides) (“[H]e is also a member of a social group composed of citizens who 
because of their economic conditions and social class (family of peasants) are unable to 
resist forced recruitment by the army”) 
121 This gendered characteristic is particularly strong in prima facie legitimate 
conscription.  While guerilla groups sometimes conscript females (although generally in 
smaller numbers than males), national governments rarely extend compulsory military 
service to females. Of course, Israel is the notable exception to this rule.  
122 The only extensive analysis of males as a particular social group in relation to 
military service is the now dated decision of the Board in V89-00074 (CRDD, 5 June 
jurisprudence to consider membership in a particular social group as providing nexus.  
Implicitly, military necessity is invoked to explain the military’s focus on men: women 
are physically unable to perform military service.  However, given the increasing 
integration of men and women in volunteer-based militaries, the fatuity of the military 
necessity argument is becoming more and more obvious.   The case law usually 
implicitly adopts this argument through its refinement of the law of general application 
framework; 
 
In Syria, military service is compulsory for all males. In our opinion, this 
constitutes an ordinary law of general application.  Females are exempt, 
but this moans [sic] only that it is not an ordinary law of uniform 
application -- it remains an ordinary law of general application.123
 
Notwithstanding this general failure of the jurisprudence, there are some cases in which 
the putative nature of conscription as a “law of general application” is brought into 
question due to the particularly male nature of its focus.   
 
A reading of recent Australian jurisprudence suggests that this analysis while largely 
ignored in Canada has been adopted elsewhere.  There is also significant municipal 
jurisprudence on this topic arising from the USA’s Selective Service Act which applies to 
only men.  Unfortunately, the assessment of whether men suffering conscription 
constitute a particular social group is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, 
especially given the relative generosity of the Canadian interpretation of particular social 
group, it is a subject to which the jurisprudence ought to pay more attention. 
 
Discrimination during recruitment can also occur where certain categories of individuals 
are automatically provided with access to alternate service.  This occurs most frequently 
for women (in the state of Israel) and established religious groups (where the military 
service law enumerates members of certain religious groups as automatically being 
conscientious objectors).  However, as always, this discrimination must rise to the level 
of persecution in order to qualify the claimant for protection. 
ii. DISCRIMINATION DURING MILITARY SERVICE 
 
After enrollment in the military, discriminatory treatment can occur during actual military 
service.  Such discrimination has been found to occur when a particular tribal group or 
gender is left unarmed and forced to perform menial tasks.124  Similarly, discriminatory 
treatment can occur if an ethnic group in the military is deliberately subjected to greater 
                                                                                                                                                 
1990). 
123 T96-03054 et al. (CRDD, 8 July 1997) at ¶ 42. 
124 A94-01191 et al. (CRDD, 30 July 1996) (at ¶ 35 “Therefore the alleged 
military conscription was in actuality a form of involuntary manual labour that was, in 
itself, a form of persecution and was not the enforcement of a law of general 
application”) 
danger than other ethnic groups.125
 
In addition to increased risk of death, discrimination can occur during military service.  
Not surprisingly, this mistreatment during military service often follows the same pattern 
as discrimination in society in general.  Thus, minority ethnic and religious groups are 
often the target of harassment during military service.  However, the military setting 
often allows the mistreatment to occur with  both increased severity and often impunity.  
Furthermore, mistreatment while in the military will seldom allow for an internal flight 
alternative and often, by definition, negates any possibility of state protection. 
 
Unfortunately, the military service jurisprudence seems to accept during military life 
what would not otherwise be accepted during non-military life.  This is particularly 
surprising given the lengthy duration and consequent repetition which is frequently a 
characteristic of in-service discrimination.  The following circumstances were not found 
to constitute a sufficient level of mistreatment: 
 
When the claimant indicated that the military authorities kept him for an 
extra month, the explanation given to him at that time was that they 
needed his services. The claimant did not believe this explanation and 
associated this extension of his service with his refusal to serve or enlist in 
the armed forces. He frequently referred to the fact that he was treated like 
an "animal," that he was "fed like an animal." He speaks of scorpions and 
snakes in Messaad, where he was forced to go to live.126
iii. DISCRIMINATION IN LENGTH OF SERVICE 
 
After enrollment in the military, discriminatory treatment can occur in the setting of the 
length of service or addition periods of subsequent “reserve” service.  If the length of a 
claimant’s service increases significantly due to an enumerated ground, such an increase 
in the length of service can qualify the claimant for protection as a refugee: 
 
Following these incidents [wherein the claimant expressed his opposition 
to Israeli government policies] and I accept the claimant's assertion that as 
a consequence of them, he received a new call up for military service in 
which the length of time he was required to serve had been increased from 
ten to twenty-four months.  I find that the period of time which the 
claimant was required to serve in the army was increased by fourteen 
months as a means of punishing him for his lack of cooperation and his 
perceived political dissidence.  . . .  I find further that increasing the 
                                                 
125 Varga v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No. 888 (FCTD) (the claimant was a 
Yugoslavian of Hungarian ethnicity; on the facts, his fear was found not be objectively 
well-founded) 
126 M90-06319 (T) (CRDD, 21 January 1991).  The Board went so far as to 
impeach the claimant for being “detatched from a reasonable sense of reality” because of 
these allegations of mistreatment. 
claimant's service time by fourteen months is a punishment which is 
sufficiently serious as to constitute persecution. 127  
 
While not addressed in the jurisprudence, discrimination in length of service can also 
arise where the military service in question is the “alternate service” of conscientious 
objectors.  Recent international human rights jurisprudence suggests that the imposition 
of a lengthier alternate service period – as a putative test of the conscientious objector’s 
genuity – constitutes unlawful discrimination.  However, in the context of refugee law, 
only an extreme lengthening of the period of alternate service would constitute 
persecution. 
D. OTHER ISSUES 
 
A few issues raised in the jurisprudence remain to be canvassed.  A claim as a military 
service evader must be made by an individual currently at risk of conscription.128  A fear 
of future conscription will not be accepted where a significant period of time will lapse 
until conscription – as would be the case with a child fearing military service upon 
reaching adulthood..129   
 
The analysis of military service, perhaps more than any other area of refugee law, 
depends on an accurate understanding of the current laws and policies of conscription.  
The military nature of systems of conscription often results in a certain secrecy about 
military service policies.  The problems of determining current country conditions with 
respect to conscription occur even regarding whether conscription is enforced in a 
particular country.130  The lack of reliability of information about a country’s compulsory 
military service regime is underscored by the previously noted inaccuracies found in 
reports about the Canadian conscription regime (or lack thereof). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Many conclusions and recommendations of this paper are implicit in the foregoing 
analysis.  The organization of the jurisprudence adopted in the foregoing survey is almost 
                                                 
127 T95-06356 (CRDD, 30 September 1997) at ¶24 and 26. 
128 T94-05552 (CRDD, 3 March 1995) (A mother cannot fear the conscription of 
her children: “Does fear for one’s children – however genuine and however profound – 
amount to persecution? The panel finds that it does not.”).  However, where complicity in 
the military service evasion may result from a close familial relation, the relative will also 
receive protection on the same basis as the military service evader (see T99-02481 et al. 
(CRDD, 29 May 2000) (at ¶ 43: “[T]he panel finds . . . the female claimant would be 
targeted by the FRY authorities because of her husband’s draft evasion and her perceived 
or actual assistance of the desertion of military service.  For the same reasons as with her 
husband, this targeting would amount to persecution.”) 
129 T93-13420 (CRDD, 3 April 1996) (Thirteen year old minors fearing 
conscription as adults) 
130 T89-05161 (CRDD, 26 March 1990) (Sudan) 
completely absent from the jurisprudence itself.  Implicitly, the primary recommendation 
of this paper is that the jurisprudence more explicitly reflect on its own organization.  In 
this regard, the jurisprudence of the Board and the Court is in desperate need of clarity.  
In this sense, clarity is used to describe a jurisprudence which applies an explicit 
framework of analysis and explicitly states its premises and conclusions.  Clarity will 
benefit have both abstract and concrete benefits.  Abstractly, clarity will allow for a more 
coherent development of the jurisprudence – and allow developments in the area of 
claims based upon military service evasion to occur in unison with developments in other 
areas of refugee law.  On a more concrete level, a clear jurisprudence will facilitate the 
presentation of claims by advocates – and will provide claimants with a clear 
understanding in advance of whether their evasion of military service is likely to ground a 
claim for protection as a refugee.  The organization of the jurisprudence adopted in this 
paper is a preliminary attempt to nudge the jurisprudence towards clarity. 
 
Secondly, the jurisprudence must pay explicit attention to international law.  Modern 
refugee law was born of  the 1951 Convention; the 1951 Convention was truly an 
international agreement between states.  As such, refugee law is a subset of public 
international law.  As a subset of public international law, refugee law necessarily 
overlaps with other areas, particularly international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.  While in other types of claims the refugee jurisprudence draws upon 
these subsets of international law, reference to international human rights and 
humanitarian law are desperately absent in the military service evasion jurisprudence. 
 
With respect to international human rights law, there is a tangled web of international 
human rights instruments, resolutions and pronouncements concerning, directly or 
indirectly, freedom of conscience, freedom of opinion and conscription.  Furthermore, 
international human rights law has engendered much scholarly debate over the extent of 
the state’s right to conscript and conscientious objection.  It is intolerable that the 
jurisprudence makes almost no reference to this body of law and commentary.  Certainly, 
the solitude of refugee law’s assessment of military service evasion needs to end.  
Refugee law’s analysis of the issue needs to be seen increasingly as a part of the larger 
international human rights debate.   In particular, the volumous jurisprudence of the UN 
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights on military service 
evasion needs to be incorporated into the analysis of refugee law. 
 
International humanitarian law provides a well-developed body of law which facilitate 
the determination of the legality of a conflict or an action within a conflict.  It has 
recently been suggested that refugee jurisprudence in general pays little attention to this 
body of law.  What is true in general of refugee jurisprudence, is especially true for 
Canadian refugee jurisprudence on military service evasion: with the exception of claims 
involving exclusion, none of the case-law involving military service evasion draws 
directly upon international humanitarian law in order to determine the validity of 
conscription.  As noted previously, proof of a serious breach of international 
humanitarian law is sufficient to establish that the conscription in question is prohibited.  
Thus, any analysis of whether a conscription is prohibited due to the nature of the 
military action should begin with an analysis of the conflict vis-à-vis international 
humanitarian law.  
 
Thirdly, the Canadian jurisprudence needs to end its parochialism.  The jurisprudence 
would benefit from the use of foreign analyses of military service evasion.  In particular, 
the House of Lord’s decision in Sepet and the Australian High Court’s decision in 
Applicant S. v. Australia (M.I.M.A.)131 could inform the jurisprudence’s analysis of, 
respectively, conscientious objection and the application of membership in a particular 
social group to military service evaders.  In addition, more generally, attention to the 
focus of the American jurisprudence on nexus would force the Canadian jurisprudence to 
make explicit some of its implicit assumptions about nexus.  Thus the use of extra-
territorial jurisprudence provides both an opportunity for the importation of new ideas 
into the Canadian jurisprudence and a requirement that the jurisprudence more explicitly 
outline its findings and assumptions. 
 
Fourthly, although largely not discussed in this paper, the use of other municipal 
jurisprudence on conscription would likely benefit the Canadian jurisprudence.  While 
conscription is no longer practiced in Canada, the existence of conscription during both 
the First and the Second World War produced a significant body of case-law delimiting 
the extent of conscription.  At the very least, an appreciation of the domestic turmoil 
caused by the imposition of conscription in Canada would perhaps decrease the number 
of condescending remarks in the jurisprudence to conscription being simply a “law of 
general application” and an ordinary  requirement of  citizenship. 
 
The prevalence of the issue of military service in refugee jurisprudence is not likely to 
decrease in the future.  It is therefore a worthwhile exercise for the judicial and 
administrative bodies responsible for refugee case-law to revisit the underlying principles 
and structure of the jurisprudence on this topic.  What is now a confusing and, at times, 
contradictory body of law can yet be rehabilitated. 
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